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 ABSTRACT
7. Facilitated news as controlled 
information flows: The origins, 
rationale and dilemmas of 
‘embedded’ journalism.
The article traces the origins, rationale and some of the dilemmas that 
have emerged in the practice of ‘embedded’ journalism. It argues that the 
practice emerged as a post-Vietnam response by the US military to the 
‘problem’ of independent news coverage of conflicts in which the US was 
involved. For the post-Vietnam US military, independent news coverage 
was problematic because it often contradicts the official war narrative and, 
if left unhindered, undermines public support for the war effort. Since public 
support is crucial for success in a foreign war, particularly during lengthy 
engagements, independent news coverage is seen as a threat to the unity 
of the home front and therefore a threat to the war effort itself. The lesson 
learned from Vietnam was to restrict independent media access to battle 
zones, first by denying all access and withdrawing security guarantees to 
journalists operating in conflict theatres, and then by providing privileged 
but controlled access to front line units via the practice of facilitated 
news-gathering known as ‘embedded journalism’.  As it turns out, even 
that practice has a downside, and there is more to the story than the military 
desire to control the narrative.
Keywords: conflict reporting, embedded journalism, facilitated news, 
independent news, objectivity, propaganda, war correspondence 
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THE RESPONSE to the ‘problem’ of independent news gathering in conflict zones in which the US military was engaged was first elaborated during the Reagan administration. It was honed and 
perfected in different ways during subsequent decades of fighting by 
Democratic and Republican governments, but the overall trend was towards 
increased control of information flows. What they have in common is the 
break with past journalistic practice. Historically, military correspondents 
are soldiers, representatives of major news outlets or independent string-
ers. Although the specifics have varied, the first are uniformed personnel 
who report in the military press or who act as ‘in house’ correspondents 
for commerical media, the second are accredited reporters with access to 
military briefings and movements, and the third are unaffiliated individuals 
who follow and sometimes accompany troops into battle but are not 
permanently attached to any particular unit or news agency. 
Embedded journalists are something else. They are media figures that 
have received an explicit invitation to join troops on a cohabitating basis for 
relatively extended periods of time. They live, patrol and often come under 
fire with the units that they are assigned to, so that, the argument goes, they 
may better understand the totality of the soldiering experience in a foreign 
combat zone (Pfau et. al., 2004, pp. 74-76).
That privileged access comes at a price, and that price is not written in any 
press guidance issued by the US Department of Defense or other militaries 
that have adopted the practice. Embedded journalists are often selected based 
upon the relationship their media employer has with the inviting government 
or the military as well as their individual propensity to support ‘the troops’ 
whom they depend on for their care and welfare while in combat zones.  The 
relationship is symbiotic. Embedded media get access to front and back line 
action while the military gets a sympathetic public depiction of its endeavours. 
Current media industry practices facilitate the use of controlled news sourcing 
by focusing on the embedded reporter’s story and those of the troops with 
which the reporter is embedded rather than the military context in which they 
operate. The reporter becomes both protagonist and narrator in the ultimate 
reality show. The terms and conditions to which the embedded reporters agree 
preclude critical scrutiny of potentially negative impact of the combat expe- 
rience on innocents and ensure that the journalistic narrative conforms to the 
military’s preferred interpretation of events. In effect, there are both push and 
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pull factors at play in the rise of embedded journalism: the military pull to 
control the news flow at the same time that there is a push for ratings-driven 
reality programming in the corporate news media. 
Withdrawal of security guarantees for independent journalists and 
termination without warning of embedded status for reporters who violate 
the terms and conditions of the facilitated news contract provide strong 
physical disincentives to engage in non-sanctioned and uncontrolled report-
ing in combat zones. For example, in 2004 the ‘embed’ credentials of two 
Virginia-based journalists were revoked because they photographed and ran 
a story about a bullet-ridden Humvee they had seen in Kuwait. This effec-
tively left them defenceless in a war zone where they had no local contacts 
or alternative security provision. The dangers of embedding exist even with 
security guarantees in place, and serve a useful purpose for the facilitating 
entity. A contrary incident such as an embedded reporter’s or accompany-
ing soldier’s death or injury suits the military narrative as to the unsavoury 
character of the adversary and the risks to the soldiers involved in fighting 
the ‘good’ fight (such as bringing freedom to oppressed people against their 
will). Sympathetic and de-contextualised coverage of contrary events serve 
to make real the immediate costs to the ‘good’ team and re-emphasises the 
need for public support for their sacrifice in what otherwise might seen as a 
distant and seemingly inconsequential, meaningless or futile conflict (since no 
modern conflict involving the US has seen its core national security interests 
at stake). Strategic breadth is sacrificed in order to achieve tactical depth and 
immediacy in reporting (Cockburn, 2010).
Facilitated news provision such as that embodied in the concept of 
embedded journalism can serve propaganda purposes—and often is no more 
than that—but it is not reducible to it. Propaganda is the direct transmission 
of ideologically supportive messages from the State to target audiences (both 
domestic and foreign). Here there is an intervening variable—the embedded 
journalist, presenting war from his or her personal perspective. For similar 
reasons embedded journalists are more than mere public relations (PR) flacks. 
A better way to look at embedded reporting is as a weapon in the informa-
tion war that runs parallel to combat. As a US military spokeman phrased it, 
‘Frankly, our job is to win the war. Part of that is information warfare. So we 
are going to attempt to dominate the information environment. Embedding 
journalists honorably served that end’ (Kahn, 2004). 
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As part of its information warfare strategy (itself a component part of 
larger psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaigns), the military may use 
journalists as third party transmission belts, amplifiers or echo chambers for 
the State-supportive message, where the message remains unaltered by the 
messenger. But embedded journalists are free to write the specific narrative 
for the events they are covering, using as a general guideline the unwrit-
ten understandings and formal protocols undertaken in order to secure the 
embedded assignment. Within those formal and informal guidelines the 
reporter can emphasise aspects of the story as he or she sees fit so long as it 
conforms to the broad objectives of the military command and the rules of 
engagement governing the embedding process. In this sense they act not so 
much as direct transmission belts for State ideology or PR agents but more 
as what Lenin referred to as ‘useful fools’ of the military apparatus: well-
meaning and sympathetic actors that disguise the controlled or manipulated 
aspect of the embedded perspective by interjecting their own thoughts and 
words into the story line.
The beauty of embedded journalism is in the synergies produced by the 
overlapping interests of security forces and news outlets: each gets to convey 
its own particular message of legitimate effort and real-time involvement 
in mutually reinforcing fashion without delving into the circumstances and 
ethics involved in the larger context into which journalists are embedded. 
The reporter burnishes his credentials as a war correspondent, the media 
employer reaffirms its privileged access to sources of power and the military 
frames the representation of conflict in narrowly constructed, sympathetic 
terms (Ricchiardi, 2003). The audience is entertained while empathising 
with the plight of the troops and reaffirming its loathing of an enemy abroad 
that seeks to do them harm (even if that enemy is fighting on its own soil 
in defence of its sovereignty and national identity). In this fashion the war 
narrative is controlled, contrived, manipulated and sanitised in the interests 
of corporate and governmental elites far removed from the conflicts in which 
the ‘reporting’ occurs. 
A brief history of facilitated newsgathering in modern US warfare
The Vietnam War taught the US many lessons, but the lessons learned were 
not necessarily those that one might suspect. Rather than recognise the 
advantages the irregular combatant has when waging protracted guer-
rilla warfare on home soil, the US military learned that its technological 
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superiority in weaponry and long-distance logistics was fatally undermined 
by a lack of popular support at home. Instead of re-examining its approach 
to unconventional warfare as both a kinetic and political exercise and the 
rationales behind ‘asymmetric’ combat that negated technological superior-
ity in the irregular battle space, the post-1975 US military determined that 
a major source of popular discontent with the war was independent journal-
ists, particularly video journalists, reporting on aspects of conflict that were 
unflattering to the US military or which cast the military effort in a negative 
light. The photographs of the napalm bombing of Trang Bang and reporting 
of the Mai Lai massacre (both of which won Pulitzer Prizes for Journalism) 
were used as examples of how such unfettered reporting undermined troop 
morale and popular support by casting the US military as villains rather than 
as saviours. In addition, this type of reporting during the 1968 Tet offensive 
contributed to the decision by Walter Cronkite, then the US’s pre-eminent 
television news anchor, to announce on a primetime national newscast that 
the war was lost (even though the Tet offensive was a tactical victory for the 
US and South Vietnamese), something that expanded domestic opposition to 
the war beyond its radical youth origins.
The immediate solution to the problem of independent journalism was 
to exclude it. War zones are dangerous places, so the US military adopted 
a policy in the 1980s of not guaranteeing journalists’ safety in combat zones, 
even if these were behind front lines. This included accredited journalists and 
independent ‘stringers’. Instead, they were advised to steer clear of direct 
reporting of front-line combat and to attend briefings hosted by the military 
commands involved. This is a practice long familiar to correspondents who 
understand the vicissitudes of the front lines (that is, bullets can fly anywhere) 
and therefore prefer to report on what the military command provides in the 
way of after-action reports and battlefield summaries. During the 1982-83 
Lebanon conflict, the 1988 invasion of Granada, the 1989 invasion of Panama, 
the 1991 Gulf War, the 1993-94 Haiti intervention and the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan, the US military informed news outlets that it could not provide 
them with security and hence access to conflict zones (Zeide, 2005, p. 1314). 
Active duty (uniformed) photographers and correspondents covered the 
action from within assigned military units while civilian journalists were 
left to rely on military briefings away from the front lines or on staged tours 
of them, on second hand reports from civilians or soldiers after the fact, 
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or to risk unauthorised forays into combat zones in which they could well be 
misidentified as ‘hostiles’ by US forces. 
Amid questions about the constitutionality of the exclusion orders, major 
US news outlets complained about the lack of access even as foreign indepen- 
dent journalists assumed the risks historically associated with war correspon- 
dence and reported directly from the field without the benefit of US military 
protection (this was less true of Grenada and Panama, where the US was 
able to prevent independent journalists from entering the countries after the 
initial invasion). Yet in a perverse way the dangers of independent reporting, 
coupled with the denial of access to US military units involved in combat, set 
the stage for the practice of journalistic embedding in military units (some call 
it ‘imbedding’, as ‘in bed with’). The concept of preferential but controlled 
media access developed in parallel to another journalistic development, which 
when combined with media demands for battlefield access and technological 
innovations transformed into the practice of embedded journalism. 
During the 1990s, US journalists were granted increased access to political 
campaigns and elected officials. Presidential press conferences increased in 
frequency, reporters travelled with candidates during their campaigns rather 
than report from selected stops along the way, C-Span was launched and 
flourished. This ‘real-time’ form of political reporting proved very profitable 
for media outlets, which could demonstrate their access and ability to shape 
a candidate’s or politician’s image based upon the extent and type of such 
access. Candidates, in turn, saw value in presenting themselves as ‘real’ peo-
ple in ‘unguarded’ moments, so both sides benefitted from the arrangement.
Developments in the media world also shaped the approach to war corres- 
pondents. In the late 1970s, as Rupert Murdoch extended his media holdings 
into the US with the launch of the first Fox channel, the concept of ‘reality 
TV’ began to dominate television ratings. Starting with the still-running show 
Cops, in which TV crews accompany local police on patrols in dozens of US 
cities, passing through a variety of MTV ‘reality’ shows and moving to entire 
channels dedicated to reality (some might call it voyeur) programming such 
as True TV and the appropriately named Escandalo (Scandal) TV for Hispanic 
audiences, the US television medium has become dominated by seemingly 
non-scripted or lightly scripted shows featuring ‘real’ people doing ‘real’ 
things, some of which are actually live or real-time in nature. Not surprisingly, 
with growing popular demand for ‘reality’ came media interest in showing the 
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reality of conflict on a real-time, first person, ‘raw’ basis. Yet with regard to 
war coverage, the standing post-Vietnam rules governing journalistic access 
to the US military engaged in conflict zones ran directly counter to such a 
project, and instead promoted highly scripted second-hand, time delayed and 
heavily filtered military descriptions of events (the classic instances of this 
being the coverage of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, which was essentially 
stage-managed by the US Central Command and Department of Defense).
The growth of internet-based news collection compounded the push of 
reality programming on corporate news organisations. As internet-based 
sources of information grew and published unvarnished accounts of pretty 
much anything (some factual, some not), corporate print and television ratings 
declined as audiences shifted their preferences to the ‘new’ media, many of 
which ran stories that did not conform to governmental or corporate dictates. 
This shift in audience preferences ran along generational lines, with youth 
leading the move to new media technologies. That foresaw an inevitable 
negative effect on corporate media profits as youth looked elsewhere for ‘raw’ 
news and as adults continued to use those alternative sources as the mainstays 
of their personal information stream. 
Faced with the downturn in audience and readership numbers, corporate 
media began to adopt some of the alternative news dissemination formats 
such as web logs. But the major response was to cut the number of dedicated 
reporters assigned to specific subject areas such as war correspondence, as this 
was the easiest managerial solution to the declining rate of news-derived profit. 
Many of those made redundant were the most experienced (and hence 
expensive) journalists in corporate media stables, who were replaced by 
inexperienced and often non-journalist ‘talking heads’ whose role was to look 
good, become famous and therefore add reality ‘bite’ to whatever story line 
they were covering. The trouble was that the new type reporters often had 
no understanding of warfare or were reluctant to engage the personal risks 
involved in genuine war correspondence. Hence the invitation to embed with 
military units provided them with an opportunity to enhance their following 
while seemingly developing an understanding of combat without facing the 
risks of independent journalists (even if the embedding situation offered more 
of a false sense of security rather than an absolute guarantee of it). In effect, 
facilitated access was granted not so much on prior credentials but on the 
basis of who reporters worked for, which suited the interests of the military, 
corporate media managers and individual journalists involved.
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Confronted by pressures to relax its ‘no access’ rule in a downsized 
corporate media climate that increasingly relied on reality programming for 
profits and celebrity reporting of news, the Pentagon began to consider alter-
native ways of facilitating news coverage that would not undermine military 
missions or popular support for them. This complemented ongoing US military 
cooperation with Hollywood, where movies such as Top Gun and Clear and 
Present Danger proved mutually profitable for studios and military recruit-
ing alike. The military wanted to extend this good working relationship to 
other mediums, and embedding journalists from major news media outlets is 
a good way of doing so.
Trial runs using reporters travelling with US military units in the 1991 
Gulf War proved very good as a form of public relations exercise, leading to 
the controlled inclusion of reporters along with US military and Coast Guard 
units undertaking low-intensity conflict tasks such as anti-narcotics operations 
and drug interdiction missions. The early experience with embedding report-
ers was positive from a military standpoint, as the coverage of the military 
operations against identifiable and unqualified enemies (such as drug dealers 
or Saddam Hussein) was generally favourable. Embedded journalists did 
appear to gain a better understanding of the reality of military life and achieved 
better depth of knowledge of what military operations, if not actual combat, 
entailed. To this was added the positive experience of embedded reporters 
during the Falklands War, where British correspondents reporting alongside 
(and completely dependent on) their troops developed close attachments to the 
units to which they were seconded, thereby contributing to positive coverage 
of the re-conquest of the islands (Misker et. al., 2003, p. 9).
Improvements in telecommunications technologies and miniaturisation 
of audio-visual equipment also made it easier for journalists to report di-
rectly from the field, lessening their dependence on support crews and fixed 
logistics lines. This played into the equation: A reporter, his or her cameras 
and computer, and a military unit = direct information from the battle zone 
(although on any given day battlefield reporting still remains subject to home 
office editorial whims that may favour celebrity scandal over bloodshed in a 
foreign country).
The military can argue with justification that the evolution of warfare 
from fixed line, conventional front engagements to more amorphous ‘shadow’ 
conflicts involving irregular combatants and unconventional tactics, coupled 
with the increased lethality of both high and low technology weaponry, made 
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it essential for their own safety that journalists embed with military units. This 
turned out to be true in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where kidnappings and 
killings of foreign journalists by insurgent forces became standard practice. By 
agreeing to the quid pro quo involved in the construct (safety for sympathy), 
embedded journalists increased their rapport with the troops and commanders 
who facilitated their reporting, thereby opening doors to ongoing command-
level briefings and one-on-one interviews with senior military figures. Even 
so, the facilitation of news coverage via embedded journalism was limited in 
the latter 1990s to low-risk environments rather than serious combat. This pre-
cluded real-time coverage of US military operations in places like Somalia (of 
Blackhawk Down fame), in Latin America (in counter-insurgency operations) 
or special operations against Serbian forces in Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The practice of limiting independent journalist access to US forces in 
combat continued after 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan. Early coverage 
of the fight against the Taliban was notable because of the lack of US-based 
reporting of it, with an array of non-US journalists (including at least one New 
Zealander) risking life and limb to cover key moments in the struggle such as 
the siege at Mazer e-Sharif and the bombing of Tora Bora.
By 2003, the long build-up to the invasion of Iraq brought with it a 
comprehensive programme for embedding journalists in US military units. 
Crafted by Pentagon comunications chief and former public relations execu-
tive Victoria Clark, guidelines were drawn up by the Central Command (the 
military command responsible for the Middle East and Central Asia) and 
approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in what became official US 
policy (US Secretary of Defense, 2003). Given its ideological predilections 
and support for the George W. Bush administration, Fox News was given pride 
of place in the embedding process, with such as retired USMC Lt. Colonel 
(and Iran-Contra conspirator) Oliver North and muckraker Geraldo Rivera 
being granted plumb assignments in the run into Baghdad. Concerned about 
being at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis Fox and operating under the 
same ‘celebrity reporter walking the walk’ model, other cable, network and 
print news outlets agreed to the terms and conditions imposed on their cover-
age of the conflict in exchange for embedded access as well. To date, more 
than 750 journalists have been embedded with US military units in Iraq. That 
in turn has led to the use of embedded reporters in Afghanistan (Cockburn, 
2010), to the point that in some journalistic circles the country became known 
as ‘Embedistan’ (Farrell, 2010). Not surprisingly, embedding-type practices 
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were adopted by US military partners such as the UK and Australia (the term 
‘embedding-type’ refers to short-term journalistic assignment into a specific 
military unit in the field rather than longer-term cohabitation arrangement. 
It is also different from one-off spot visits or military briefings). In one form 
or another, by the end of the first decade of the millennium, embedded jour-
nalism has become a standard feature in the media approach to covering war.
Embedded reporting as Trojan Horse
There was bound to be unanticipated synthesis emerging from the 
action-reaction, thesis and antithesis relationship between the military and 
embedded journalists. The relationship evolved, but not in the controlled 
fashion that the military would have hoped. Specifically, as the media and 
the military became more comfortable with the practice of embedding 
journalists in military units, a curious role change occurred. Rather than an 
instrument employed by the military to get its favoured message across, 
embedded journalism became a potential ‘enemy’ within. This was the 
result of changing attitudes on the part of the military and the press corps as 
conflicts continued and home audience preferences changed. The result has 
been something other than the original intention of framing the narrative. 
The success of the original embedding project during the 2003 Iraq 
invasion and occupation encouraged the military to expand the reach of 
facilitated news provision. Content analysis of embedded versus non- 
embedded reporting confirmed that embedded journalists were more likely to 
present favourable interpretations of military activities and the soldiers that 
they served with (Robbe, 2010). Yet, by 2007 the American public had begun 
to lose interest in war stories. This was in part due to impatience and frustra-
tion on the part of the US public as months turned to years of engagement 
without clear victory in sight in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the myriad 
distractions provided by American popular culture and the dislocating effects 
of economic recession on public interest in military engagements abroad, by 
2008 the US military sought to move beyond the now routine coverage of 
infantry and armoured tactical patrols and human interest stories and into 
command centres in which strategic decision-making occurred. 
Such was the case with the US Afghanistan command, where General 
Stanley McChrystal and General David Petraeus (who also permitted em-
bedded reporters in the Iraq military command) allowed facilitated news 
gathers to report from inside their command headquarters. The idea behind the 
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expansion ‘upwards’ of embedded news coverage from tactical operations to 
theatre and strategic policy-making was to demonstrate to the American public 
the complexity and extent of this new form of ‘asymmetric’ warfare in which 
the enemy fought and hid amongst civilian populations who were not entirely 
supportive of the international effort to free them from local despotism and in 
which a multiplicity of other national and international actors were involved. 
The logic of the US military decision to ‘upscale’ the embedding process 
was simple: for an American public increasingly disinterested in the wars and 
disillusioned about the lack of progress towards a concrete victory in them, em-
bedded reporting from the command headquarters involved in those conflicts 
would shed light on the intricacy of the situation as well as the need to continue 
to be steadfast in pursuit of a favourable outcome. Thus the narrative shifted 
from the ‘grunt’ level perspective of the soldier on patrol to the strategic logic 
of the generals who understood that the US had to continue its war missions 
for larger reasons beyond finding Osama bin Laden1 and killing terrorists— 
issues that included matters of international reputation, alliance commitment, 
deterrence, and other geopolitical and strategic concerns. With the facilitated 
move upwards, embedded reporters are now privy to the bigger picture and 
the broader contours of the multi-layered game that is international conflict.
The trouble for the US military is that removing embedded reporters from 
the battlefield where their personal security rests in the hands of the soldiers 
with whom they travel and moving them to secure command headquarters 
where both their creature comforts and security are assured by the more benign 
kinetic environment and layers of security surrounding the command, serve 
to loosen the physical dependence of embedded journalists on the military 
units to which they are attached. Even while on front line duty many embed-
ded journalists began to interview troops from units to which they were not 
attached simply in search of a fresh story line, in semi-independent fashion. 
This situation was compounded by the fact that just as the American public and 
the corporate media began to lose interest in tactical-level embedding other 
media outlets requested embedded status, including some with alternative 
perspectives on matters of government policy such as the Public Broadcasting 
System, Pacifica News Network and Rolling Stone Magazine.
With broader media access to the embedding process and with looser 
physical security ties between soldiers and reporters at the command 
level, and given the debates over foreign military policy dividing the US 
political elite and public throughout the early 2000s, the stage was set for 
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embedded journalism to become the Trojan Horse of US military campaigns. 
That occurred in 2010, when Rolling Stone reporter Michael Hastings 
published a story about General McChrystal and his command staff detailing 
how they were deeply critical of, if not insubordinate to, President Obama, 
Vice-President Biden and some of their closest advisers (Hastings, 2010). The 
uproar that ensued was fatal to General McChrystal’s career and seriously 
undermined the Obama administration’s attempts to convey a unified and 
coherent approach to national security affairs.
Although General McChrystal resigned and General Petraeus accepted 
a demotion in order to replace him as Commander-in-Chief of US forces in 
Afghanistan, the damage was done at several levels. The Rolling Stone story 
detailed deep policy divisions and personal disrespect between members of the 
military hierarchy and civilian command authority as well as basic uncertainty 
among all of them about the progress of the war effort in Afghanistan. These 
revelations were in turn noted by US allies in the UN-mandated and NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting in Afghanistan, 
with the resultant loss of support undermining allied commitment to continu-
ing their engagement with the US-led ISAF coalition. To that was added the 
oft-times unflattering commentary of troops in the field to other embedded 
reporters regarding the local population and the Afghan national leadership. 
Eager to press the news cycle envelope in the quest for ratings and wishing to 
capitalise on the deep political divisions extant at home for partisan purposes, 
even ‘loyal’ American reporters began to deviate from the military’s preferred 
narrative. This posed a serious dilemma for the US military, as it had come to 
depend on embedded journalism as an antidote and counter-weight to critical 
reporting of US military activities from independent and mostly foreign jour-
nalists and media organisations, including the Russia Today (RT) network, the 
BBC, an assortment of European media sources, Al Jazeera and the WikiLeaks 
organisation (which has its own version of embedded reporters in the form of 
disgruntled US military personnel leaking classified information to it).
Beyond arguments about whether the quoted conversations were on 
or off the record, the important thing to note about the McChrystal/Rolling 
Stone story is that Hastings did not violate the guidelines and policies for 
embedded journalists issued by the Central Command and Department of 
Defense in 2003. To the contrary, he reported on issues that had nothing to 
do with combat per se and all to do with the relationships and dispositions 
of those in flag-level field billets and their superiors in Washington DC. 
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The conventions and protocols established in 2003 for the embedding of 
journalists did not cover such reporting options because it presumed that 
acceptance of the embedding conditions operative at the tactical level translated 
into journalistic ‘loyalty’ to the military units involved even if the focus of 
coverage moved to the command level. In the current media climate, that was 
a stretch too far. Not surprisingly, in August 2010 Hastings had his ‘embed’ 
credentials revoked by the US Department of Defense (Greenwald, 2010).
The US military now sits on the horns of a dilemma: it needs embedded 
journalists to convey its preferred message, but it can no longer rely on them 
to faithfully do so. Moreover, other militaries have used journalists to convey 
their own messages, not all of which accord with that of the US (for example, 
the NZDF prefers to use journalists to emphasise the humanitarian aspects 
of their involvement in ISAF rather than the fact that some of the NZDF 
assets deployed in Afghanistan—the SAS in particular—are there to kill and 
deter Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. This detracts from the US message that 
the main ISAF objective is not nation-building and the promotion of human 
rights but to defeat the Taliban and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe 
haven for al-Qaeda). To that can be added the return of independent journalists 
(again, mostly non-US citizens) to difficult-to-control battle spaces such as 
in Afghanistan, which unlike Iraq cannot be easily ring-fenced or cordoned 
off using land and air power given the nature of the terrain. This means that 
the US military is more or less back to square one when it comes to control-
ling the message about the conflicts in which it is engaged (this is less so for 
special operations missions in places like Yemen or Pakistan, which are highly 
secret and conducted in conditions of extreme danger, thereby diminishing 
the likelihood of any real time press coverage).
Where corporate media and military interests overlap and diverge
In the early days of embedded journalism corporate media and military in-
terests overlapped. Corporate media saw a profitable return on its investment 
in embedded journalism and the US military saw a positive spin given to its 
combat operations. But as time drew on and audience preferences gravitated 
to the likes of The Amazing Race and Jersey Shore, the quest for ratings-
driven profit, counterpoised against the need to maintain public support for 
US military operations abroad, forced a divergence in perspectives between 
the US military and the corporate media. Sympathetic war reporting was 
increasingly seen by the US public as boring if not mere propaganda. It was 
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no longer ‘fresh’. In a US political climate of deep partisan division, corpo-
rate media managers increasingly turned to ‘edgy’ stories that had a critical 
perspective on war and its consequences so as to maintain falling reader and 
viewership ratings. Some of it is quite partisan and anti-US—witness RT 
coverage of any US military operations, al-Jazeera coverage of US policy 
in the Muslim world, including its military engagement with it, and the 
thrust of WikiLeaks document ‘dumps’—but much critical reporting on US 
military operations is done by US and allied media agencies and citizens 
with no particular ideological or nationalistic axe to grind. 
As a result, the US military has learned the hard way what others already 
knew: that money is made by ratings, and ratings are made by providing news 
that is ‘fresh’. So long as military and media interests overlapped—that is, 
the media made money providing sympathetic coverage of military opera-
tions—then all was well. But as soon as audiences tired of the sympathetic, 
narrow tactical-level view of war and ratings for such news began to drop, 
then the interests of the military and media began to diverge. The US military 
thought best to go strategic with embedded reporting in order to sell the public 
on the stakes and complexities involved in conflict zones like Afghanistan. For 
the corporate media, the answer to audience disinterest was not just to accept 
the move into command-level embedding (which it was happy to do). It was 
also to resume critical reporting in order to regain the ‘edgy’ perspective that 
drove ratings and readership under the banner of press freedom. Under such 
conditions having embedded journalists ‘go strategic’ made the problem of 
uncontrolled reporting worse, not better.
Conclusion
As a type of news-gathering exercise, embedded journalism appears to be 
here to stay. Originally facilitated with the purpose of framing the narra-
tive emerging from battle zones in light of the negative impact independent 
journalism had on US public support for war, over the last decade it has 
taken on a life of its own driven by profit-oriented corporate media logics 
and a general tendency by news-gathering entities to no longer submit to 
being manipulated in overt ways. Even if not universally accepted, editorial 
independence within the embedded context is being asserted in a measure 
that the US military did not foresee when it enunciated its formal guidelines 
and policies for embedding in 2003. Efforts to expand the embedding practice 
to the command level backfired with revelations of command-level discord 
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even while US public attention continues to drift away from war coverage 
in general (one of the remarkable aspects of the November 2010 US 
midterm elections was that debate over US military operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere were virtually non-existent, having been 
eclipsed by arguments about taxation, federal deficit spending, illegal 
immigration and changing cultural mores). In sum, embedded journalism 
evolved from an instrument of military control to a double-edged sword once 
ratings-driven  media logics argued in favour of a move away from sympathetic 
 and narrow tactical coverage. Moving the focus of embedded scrutiny up the 
chain of command only worsened the conundrum.
It is difficult to predict how the practice of embedded journalism will 
evolve. It may be discontinued and replaced with the usual PR junkets 
into military zones and a return to more ‘old school’ non-embedded war 
correspondence. But it more likely will survive as a journalistic practice, 
in more than one guise.  One potential scenario is that it will bifurcate 
into two streams: one an instrumental  PR/propaganda stream in which 
militaries use sycophantic reporters or celebrities—comedians are very good 
for this purpose, as Bob Hope’s Vietnam ASO tours proved even if the war 
was ultimately lost—as tools in order to transmit a controlled and contrived 
message about their operations within a specific news cycle. There could also 
be a second critical stream in which, with a mind towards the historical record, 
military commanders permit journalists to report freely (within the limits of 
operational security) from within designated units over extended periods of 
time. This stream will be truthful but perhaps time-delayed so as to protect 
both the guilty and the innocent. 
Both streams will depend on government approval, and that in turn hinges 
on government agreement in principle with the notions of a free press acting 
as a critic and conscience of society. Since many nations continue to be ruled 
by authoritarians of various stripes and many democracies, new and old, are 
suffering from various forms of institutional sclerosis, ethical decay, lack of 
accountability, corruption, apathy, commodity fetishism and other maladies, 
it will not be surprising if the first stream dominates the latter, or that a return 
to the practice of denying facilitated press access to the battlefield is seen by 
States as the preferred method for dealing with news-gathering in a combat 
environment. The answer ultimately lies in public demand for journalistic 
objectivity and an honest media focus on government accountability in war 
as well as peace. 
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Note
1. From 2001 to 2011, Osama bin Laden was the major target of the so-called War on 
Terror. On 2 May 2011, he was shot dead inside a walled compound in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan, by US Navy Seals on a secret mission. 
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